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Introduction

1
Measuring income inequality one is often interested in the contribution of different .
(sub )groups of the population to overall inequality. Then one has to employ appropriate inequality measures which allow to identify the impact of subgroups on total inequality. The measures have to be decomposable for a given partition of the population. This paper suggests a new method of decomposing inequality and provides a complete characterization of the class of measures satisfying the corresponding decomposition property.
Thirty years ago a number of papers were published dealing with the decomposition of inequality measures.
2 These measures were supposed to be additively decomposable: If a given population is split into any two mutually exclusive and exhausting subgroups, overall income inequality can be decomposed into a within-group and a between-group inequality term. The first one is a weighted sum of the subgroup income inequality values. The betweengroup term measures the inequality between both subgroups by considering a smoothed income distribution for each subgroup -which is generated by replacing the actual incomes by the respective average income or by using some representative income.
A simple example demonstrates a shortcoming of this (conventional) approach. Consider a population which consists of two subgroups each containing two individuals and let the income vector of group 1 b. , e given by X 1 = (10,20) and that of group 2 by X 2 = (15,15).
Then the average incomes are identical (and equal to 15) . If the average income is chosen as representative income, between-group inequality is measured by the inequality of the income vector (15, 15, 15, 15) , i.e.; it is equal to zero since all (representative) incomes are the same.
We obtain the same result if subgroup 2 had the income vector X 2 = ( 5, 25) as the average · income in group 2 is still 15. On the other hand, things have changed drastically: The individual in group 1 having income 10 (20) is now no longer the poorest (richest) one in the population, i.e., there is someone in group 2 with less (more) income. Thus the inequality between both subgroups is now different from the inequality in the original situation. But this change is not reflected by the between-group term in the decomposition of inequality.
This paper presents an alternative to the conventional decomposition method and investigates its implications for inequality measures. They can be decomposed into the usual within-group 1 and a new,. simple between-group term. The representation of the inequality between two subgroups is based on an intuitive idea. We measur1e this inequality directly by a comparison of all pairs of income; i.e., we compare the income of each individual in the first group with the income of each individual in the second group. The between-group term is then formed by the sum of all these inequality values. As usual overall inequality is equal to the sum of the · within-group term and the between-group term. In this case, the change of income in our example from X 2 to X 2 is properly reflected by the between-group term.
For both methods the decomposition process is a top-down approach: The level of overall inequality is known and is then decomposed into several meaningful components. The new decomposition property can, however, also be interpreted the other way around: Starting from two given groups we can combine them to a new overall population. In this case overall inequality is constructed from the inequality values within the two groups and the additional inequality generated by combining both (sub )groups which is represented by the corresponding between-group term. Then we obtain an aggregation property and a bottom-up approach (cf. also the interpretation provided in Shorrocks (1984) ). This idea can be made more precise · if we consider two particular subgroups. We can enlarge a given subgroup by exactly one individual. Since there is no within-group inequality if the group consists only of one individual, the within-group inequality term is determined by the inequality value for the original (sub )group. The between-group term boils down to the inequality values comparing each income belonging to an individual in the original group with the new individual's income . .
Overall inequality is then again a sum of both terms and the aggregation process is additive.
In the following, Section 2 introduces the framework, the notation used, and the basic set of properties for inequality measures: Normalization requires that there is no inequality if all incomes are identical. Symmetry postulates that the identity of individuals is irrelevant. The principle of population makes the inequality measures for different population sizes consis-.
tent. Two principles for the redistribution of income are considered. The Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers requires that a rank-preserving transfer of income from a richer individual to a poorer one decreases inequality, and the concentration principle postulates that a concentration3 of income diminishes the level of inequality. In section 3 the new decomposition and aggregation properties are proposed and motivated. Some examples are given. Then the class of weakly decomposable measures is characterized which satisfy the new decomposition axiom. Under weak assumptions the decomposition property and the population principle -3 -jointly determine the general structure of an inequality measure. These properties imply that · for a given population size an inequality measure has to be proportional to the sum of the levels of income inequality between all pairs of individuals. Therefore the measure is based on pairwise comparisons of income and depends on the choice of an arbitrary inequality measure defined for two individuals. Conversely, it is shown that the type of measure derived satisfies the decomposition property and the principle of population; i.e., we obtain a simple .
characterization of the class of weakly decomposablle inequality measures. In this characterization the decomposition property can be replaced equivalently by the aggregation property.
In section 4 we apply this result by choosing three different families of measures for two individuals. The first one is given by the absolute income differential (or a power of it). We obtain a characterization of a family of measures which are equal to the average of the (power .
of the) income differentials between all pairs of individuals. These measures form a one parameter (the exponent) extension of Gini's mean difference. Then the investigation is extended to the corresponding family of relative measures by exploiting the fact that the family derived consists of compromise measures which are absolute or relative measures depending on the way they are represented. We introduce a variant of the decomposition property and then get a corresponding one paramek~r extension of the Gini coefficient. This family ofrelative measures takes into account mean incomes. The result in particular demonstrates that the Gini coefficient satisfies an aggregation property. Finally, we consider a family of measures extending the variance of logarithms. Though these indices satisfy the original form of the decomposition property they are: relative measures. This outcome demonstrates that this property is flexible and not limited to absolute measures. The families considered have -.to the best knowledge of the author -not yet been characterized in the literature.
Section 5 concludes.
In summary, the contribution of the paper is fourfold: First, it suggests a new decomposition and an aggregation property for the measurement of inequality which have intuitive appeal.
Second, it characterizes the corresponding class of weakly decomposable and weakly aggregable inequality measures. Third, by applying this result the properties of three families of inequality measures are described. They extend Gin.i's mean difference, the Gini coefficient, and, respectively, the variance of logarithms. Fourth, the results presented can also be used to measure the dispersion inherent in any distribution and are therefore also relevant for other applications.
-4 -
Framework and basic properties
To begin with we introduce the framework and the notation. For every population size n 21
there are n individuals numbered by i, for i = 1, ... , n. Individual i's income is denoted by
Xi E Q where Q = JR or JR++ . An income distribution is described by a vector For n 2 1 an inequality index is defined by a function I ( ·, n) : n ( n) ~ JR+ . An inequality measure I consists of a countable sequence of inequality indices {I ( ·, n)} n2'.i which contains exactly one inequality index for every population size n '?. l. These indices are not necessarily related for different population sizes, but we suppose that either n( n) = JR 11 or n( n) =JR:+ for all n 2 l. We always set I(X,l) = 0 for X E n since for n = 1 there cannot be any inequality.
Given this setting we introduce some standard 4 properties for inequality indices and inequality measures: ' ... ,Xn-(n) ) for a permutation :r of {l, ... ,n}.
PP (Principle of Population): I ( X(m), mn) = I ( X, n) for all X E n ( n) and m, n 2 2.
4
See Kolm ( 197 6a, 197 6b, 1999 ) for a thorough discussion of inequality measurement.
-5 -NORM postulates that an inequality index equals zero if and only if all incomes are equal.
This property normalizes the index I ( ·, n) . We furthermore obtain I ( X, n) > 0 whenever the incomes considered are not identical. Thus I ( ·, n) cannot be constant. As in our framework individuals can differ only with respect to income there is no reason to treat them differently:
SYM guarantees anonymity (I(·, n) is symmetric). The principle of population requires that .
inequality should depend only on the statistical distribution of income. A view at the literature demonstrates that this property has in general two consequences: It makes indices for different population sizes consistent and comparable, and it gives some additional structure to the indices involved.
For the measurement of inequality we have to consider the redistribution of income and intro-· duce two principles. First, the Pigou-Dalton principl1e of transfers going back to Pigou (1912) and Dalton (1920 
PT is the classical principle of redistribution. Second, the principle of concentration postulates that any equiproportional reduction of the distanc1~ between each income and the (fixed) average income decreases inequality. It has been mentioned by Kolm (1996 Kolm ( , 1999 , is discussed in detail by Ebert (2009) , and has also been used by Aaberge (1997 Aaberge ( , 2001 . 5 A concentration is defined by the transformation 5 A concentration Tl( is equivalent to a lump sum transfer K p ( X) in combination with a proportional tax (the tax rate is equal to K ). Aaberge (1997) uses this tool in order to interpret changes in rank-dependent inequality measures. In Aaberge (200 I) this transformation is employed in the characterization of preference relations defined on the set of Lorenz curves and of rank-dependent measures of inequality.
-6 -and the corresponding principle is given by
PC (Principle of Concentration):
Both principles coincide for n = 2. For n > 3 the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers implies the principle concentration, i.e., PC is weaker than PT. Consider e.g. the income distribution X: = (4,12,14). Then µ(X) = 10. A concentration TK leads to TK(X) =X+K(6,-2,-4) .
For K = 1/2 we obtain Y := (7,11,12). All incomes move towards the average income which is not changed by this kind of redistribution. Since the components of the vector (µ(X)l 11 -X) sum up to zero it is obvious that the sum of the negative entries is equal to the sum of the positive entries. Therefore a concentration can always be decomposed into a series of progressive transfers (in our case: X _.., ( 5, 11, 14) =: Z _.., ( 7, 11, 12) 
is a particular combination of progressive transfers. Then both principles imply that I(Y) < I(X), but PC is silent when only a progressive transfer is applied yielding Z. On the other hand I ( Z) < I ( X) is an implication of PT. Therefore it is worthwhile to derive the implications of both principles.
6
PP is an axiom for an inequality measure whereas the other properties are concerned with inequality indices. Accordingly we define for any property Q E { SYM, NORM, PT, PC} that an inequality measure I satisfies Q if every inequality index I ( ·, n) satisfies Q for n ~ 2 .
Weakly decomposable and weakly aggregable inequality measures
In this section the decomposition property and aggregation property are introduced and discussed. Weakly decomposable and weakly aggregable inequality measures are defined.
Then their relationship is clarified. Finally the class of weakly decomposable ( aggregable) measures is characterized.
Definitions
At first we consider the (new) decomposition method in more detail and suggest 
DEC( omposition):
Property DEC allows us to decompose overall ine:quality in a population of size n into a within-group term I w and between-group term I B for any partition.
and
The first one is a weighted sum of the inequality values of the two subgroups, i.e.,
. It corresponds to the usual within-group term used in the literature (cf. e.g., Bourguignon (1979) , Shorrocks (1980) ). The weighting functions a 1 ( n) and a 2 ( n) depend only on the population and subgroup size(s) and have to be strictly positive. They do not necessarily sum to unity and they are assumed to be independent of the . 
). In our case, no smoothing is required. We compare the · inequality directly, i.e., we consider the inequality between all pairs of individuals -one belonging to subgroup 1, the other one belonging to subgroup 2. Then, of course, we have to take into account the total between-group inequality by adding up these inequality values.
f3 ( n) represents a scaling factor.
An inequality measure I is called weakly decomposable if it satisfies DEC. It should be emphasized that the decomposition method is considered for two subgroups. It can, however, be extended to more than two subgroups by repeated (recursive) application of (1 ). Furthermore, it is interesting to classify the property DEC more precisely. The present paper is obviously normative since it characterizes various families of inequality measures by a small .
number of relevant properties. On the other hand, a decomposition property is mainly descriptive since it allows us to find a particular representation of the underlying inequality -8 -ordering. This representation is essentially cardinal and can be employed to calculate the contribution of each subgroup to overall inequality.
The definition of the between-group term is based on an elementary approach and seems to be more natural than using the smoothed income distributions for a comparison. It assigns a particular role to the inequality index for two individuals. But it is easy to see that the between-group term IB reduces to the conventional (smoothed) between-group term when .
there is no inequality within groups. This observation provides a link between DEC and the conventional subgroup decompositions. Closer inspection of the term demonstrates that for weakly decomposable measures between-group inequality in general depends on the distribution of income within the subgroups considered. The entire term can also be interpreted as an index measuring the distance between the income distributions of both subgroups. In principle there are infinitely many ways of calculating the distance between two income distributions (cf. the statistical literature on this topic, e.g. Bickel and Doksum (2000) , and also Ebert (1984) and Deutsch and Silber (1999) ). One extreme possibility of determining this distance is to use only the average incomes (the conventional method). The other extreme is to utilize the full information available, i.e., to consider the inequality between all pairs of income (the new method). Choosing an extreme form of the term (as is done also in this · paper) represents one possibility. Of course, it is also possible to consider further intermediate cases and to distinguish between them by imposing appropriate conditions. This will be done in another paper.
On the other hand the definition provided in (1) is therefore quite intuitive. The betweengroup inequality term necessarily depends on th<~ distribution of incomes whenever its · definition is not based on the arithmetic means. Ethical inequality measures use the corresponding equally distributed incomes for measuring between-group inequality and depend on the distribution of income within the subgroups (cf. e.g., Blackorby, Donaldson and Auersperg (1981) and Ebert (1999) ). The same is true for the measures investigated by Foster and Shneyerov ( 1999, 2000) which employ a generalized mean as representative · income. The issues addressed here have therefore always to be dealt with in these cases (cf.
also the discussion of Foster and Shneyerov (1999) in their concluding section).
Using the conventional definition of the between-· group term has the advantage that any transfer within a subgroup does not change the value of the term. Thus at first sight the new concept of between-group inequality seems to be not as clear-cut as it is in the classical case · of decomposition if between-group inequality is measured by the inequality between the -9 -average mcomes of the subgroups (cf. Shorrocks (1980 Shorrocks ( , 1984 ). On the other hand the example provided in the introduction clearly demonstrates that employing only the average incomes is restrictive and actually is a disadvantage as distributional considerations are entirely ignored. Therefore the new form of the between-group term is appealing and justified since the distributions of income in both subgroups are taken into account.
Furthermore, the between-group term also reacts in particular situations in a way one would expect intuitively. Suppose tpat there are two subgroups, each containing two individuals. Let their incomes be given by X
In this case there is some overlapping and a specific pattern of incomes. The incomes of subgroup 2 are more extreme than those of subgroup 1. Then any regressive transfer within subgroup 2 will increase the between-group inequality term (if the measure satisfies the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers).
Thus property DEC has a lot of appeal since the between-group term takes into account all incomes and does not require any smoothing. The property is satisfied by several well-known 
A referee points at the fact that this decomposition of Gini's mean difference can be obtained by a decomposition of the cumulative income distribution function F (in the continuous framework). Suppose that 2 F ( X) = I P,F; ( X) where p 1 is the population share of subgroup i.
(cf. e.g. Yitzhaki (1998)) we get by insertion
Gini 's mean difference associated with the cumulative distribution function F; .
8
Dagum (1997) presents a particular decomposition of the Gini-coefficient into the inequality within the subgroups, the net inequality between subgroups, and a third term related to the intensity of overlapping between the subgroups. The sum of his second and third terms is identical to the between-group inequality term defined here.
9
The Gini-coefficient can also be decomposed by income components -if there are different sources of income (cf. Rao (1969) ). This topic is not dealt with here.
-10 -We get the same result for the variance V ( X, n) since
Similarly, the variance of logarithms VL ( X, n) also satisfies DEC.
10 It can also be defined .
with respect to the geometric mean:
and it can be rewritten as
2n i=I j=I
Now we tum to a different interpretation of the decomposition property DEC. Given two groups of size n 1 and n 2 the property DEC describies the inequality in an overall population of size n = n 1 + n 2
• In other words, DEC can also be interpreted as an aggregation property. If .
we know the indices I(-, n 1 ), I(-, n 2
) and I(·, 2) we are able to define an inequality index for a population of size n = n 1 + n 2 by using (1 ). Following this idea we introduce a particular case of ( 1) by considering a partition described by n = ( n, 1) :
AGG(regation):
For all n ~ 1 there exist strictly positive weighting functions r( n + 1) and .
i=l for all XE O(n) and Xn+l E Q.
Here we start from a population of size n and enlarge it by one individual. Then the income inequality for a population of size n + 1 is determined in two steps: At first, the inequality for the subgroup of the individuals 1 to n is computed and taken into account by r ( n + 1) I ( X, n). It corresponds to the (total) within-group term since individual n + 1 forms a subgroup of size 1, in which by assumption no within-group inequality exists. In a second · step the income inequality between each individual belonging to the subgroup of size n and 10 It is well known that VL violates the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers.
-11 -individual n + 1 is calculated and taken into consideration by 5 ( n + 1) l:i 1( Xi, Xn+P 2). This sum represents the between-group inequality term. The aggregation property requires that the · overall inequality value is a sum of both components: (within-group and between-group term).
This basic idea can be used for all n 21. Therefore we obtain a recursive definition of inequality indices. It is obvious that an inequality m1~asure, i.e., a sequence of indices, satisfying AGG is already uniquely determined by the inequality index 1(·,2) and the sequence of weights { r ( n), 5 ( n)} 
Relationship
Next we have to clarify the relationship between the properties DEC and AGG. Formally property AGG describes a particular variant of DEC: We have r ( n + 1) = a 1 ( n, 1) and
). Thus we immediately obtain
Proposition 1: Every weakly decomposable inequality measure I is weakly aggregable.
Conversely, we can establish ·
Proposition 2: Assume that I is a weakly aggregable inequality measure and that 1(·,2) satisfies NORM and SYM. Then 1 is weakly decomposable.
Thus both properties are equivalent given weak assumptions on the inequality index for two individuals. Indeed, below it will tum out that the classes of weakly decomposable and weakly aggregable inequality measures coincide if the principle of population is additionally imposed.
Proof of Proposition 2
The assertion is proved in four steps: (a) At first a simple (technical) implication of AGG is 
I(X,n)= L cr;(n)L1(xi'xJ,2)
)=2 i=I 11 for XEO(n) and n22 where 11 8(2)=1 and cr.(n)=8(J) r;c r(k)for }=2, ... ,n.
. J
k=;+I
Proof: The statement is correct for n = 2. Now suppose that it has been proved for n 2 2.
Then AGG yields that
, o(J(Q,r(k)) t.1( XPXJ,2)+8(n+1)t,1(X;,X,.1,2) = ~ou)(nr(k)) t.1(x;>x 1 ,2).
Furthermore, 8 ( 2) = 1 for x E n ( n) and x11+l E n is implied by AGG and NORM since 
I(X,n) = + L L ru(n)I(X;,X;,2)++ L L ru(n)I(X;,X;,2) · (4)
where ri/ ( n) : = crJ ( n) for i < j . We define r if ( n) : = er; ( n) for i > j and get r ii ( n) = r;; ( n)
The first term of the right hand side of ( 4) 
Interchanging the indices i and j and observing the symmetry of Tu ( n) we obtain
, 2) for the second term of the right hand side. Therefore
i= I j =I j-cF-i which proves symmetry of I ( ·, n) for n ~ 2 .
(c) Claim: Assume that I satisfies AGG and that 1(·,2) satisfies NORM and SYM Then
for all X dl( n) and n <: 2 'where 0(2) =I and 0( n) = 0 (2)( b,r( k)).
Proof:
The statement is true for n = 2 (use claim (a), and NORM and SYM of I ( ·, 2) ). The · proof is by induction.
We define X,Y E n(n+ 1) by setting xi: = x for i = 1, .. . ,n' xn+I := y and Yi: = y, r: := x for i = 2, ... , n + 1 for any X, y E JR.++ C Q and X-:/:-y.
Then I ( X, n + 1) = I ( Y, n + 1) since I is symmetric (employ claim (a) and (b) ).
Using AGG, the result already proved for n, and the specific structure of X and Y, we get and
NORM implies that I(x,x,2) = I(y,y,2) = 0. Equating both equations and rearranging terms .
we obtain -14 -
Since l(·,2) satisfies NORM and x -:t-y we get I(x,y,2) > 0. Then the bracket on the LHS has to be zero and we obtain, J ( n + 1) = y ( n + 1 )J ( n) = J ( 2) (Er ( k)). 
D
Characterization
Now we are in a position to investigate the consequences of the principle of population. 
for all X E n ( n) and n ~ 2 .
It turns out that -given that I ( ·, 2) satisfies NORM -property DEC (or AGG) and the prin-· ciple of population already determine the structure of an inequality measure uniquely: The only degree of freedom left is the choice of the index I ( ·, 2) . It is easy to see that the measure I is then symmetric and also satisfies NORM. The weighting functions used in DEC and AGG are determined implicitly. Employing (7) we obtain the decomposition -15 -
for all X 1 Er2(n 1 ),X 2 Er2(n 2 ), n=(n 1 ,n 2 ), and n 1 +n 2 22
and the aggregation rule for all X E Q ( n) , X
11
+ 1 E Q and n 2 1 .
Obviously the weights are used to 'renormalize' the indices I(-, n 1 ) , I(-, n 2 ), I(-, n) and I(-, 2). The size of the (sub )groups has to be taken into account properly. The weights of the within-group term do not sum up to unity -a phenomenon which is well· known from the literature (cf. e.g. the generalized entropy class in Shorrocks (1980) ). This fact is an · implication . of the principle of population imposed in Theorem 1. Consider the measure /* (X,n) := nl(X,n) -where I is defined in (7). It also satisfies DEC (and AGG), but violates PP. Its weighting functions are given by ai ( n 1 , n 2 ) = n/ ( n 1 + n 2 ) for i = 1, 2, add up to unity, and are equal to the population share of the subgroup.
To sum up, any inequality index 1(·,2) which satisfies NORM and only two axioms -DEC (or AGG) and PP -yields a unique inequality measure I. This result demonstrates that the decomposition and, respectively, the aggregation property is powerful. Few axioms suffice to obtain the measure described in (7). In particular, no regularity condition like continuity has to be imposed: the characterization is parsimonious.
Proof of Theorem 1
The assertion is proved in four steps: (a)-( c) demonstrate necessity. Conversely, sufficiency is proved in ( d).
(a) Claim: DEC implies AGG (Proposition 1).
-16 -(b) Claim: Assume that 1 satisfies 2) satisfies NORM Then 1 is symmetric.
Proof:
The principle of population and claim (a) of the proof of Proposition 2 imply
Analogously we can consider l(X 2 ,Xp2) and get
2).
Subtraction and some rearrangement yield
We know from (8) that 1-CY 2 ( 4 )-2CY 4 ( 4) > 0 since NORM satisfied by 1 ( ·, 2) implies that
Therefore also l-CY 2 ( 4) + CY 3 ( 4)-2CY 4 ( 4) > 0 smce CY 3 ( 4) > 0 and we obtain ·
The rest follows from claim (b) of the proof of Proposition 2.
(c) Claim: Assume that I satisfies AGG and PP and that 
<5 ( n) = 4/ n 2 for n ~ 1.
-17 -Proof: Since (b) implies that I is symmetric, we can use claim ( c) of the proof of Proposition
Now choose any XE n( n) and m ~ 2. Then by the definition of the replicated income distribution we obtain
and therefore
Then we get 6(n)n 2 = constant for n~2. For n = 2 we have 6(2)·2 2 = 4 since 6(2) = 1. It is obvious that (7) implies ,PP (and NORM and SYM). Furthermore, we define
) 2 for i = I, 2, and, respectively, 
Some f am iii es of measures
The above analysis demonstrates that the inequality index for two individuals is crucial for any inequality measure satisfying the properties considered in Theorem 1. This index can in -18 -principle be an arbitrary indicator defined for two individuals which evaluates the inequality inherent in a distribution and which satisfies the necessary properties. In the following we consider three families of measures by using an appropriate index for two individuals: First, we derive (an extension of) Gini' s mean difference. Second, we suggest a variant of the decomposition property which allows us to characte1ize (an extension) of the Gini coefficient.
Third, we introduce a simple family of indices which extend the variance .of logarithms and have not been considered in the literature up to now.
Extension of Gini's mean difference
We introduce the family of indices Ke(X,2):=~~ ff IX;-Xl =IX 1 -x2'6/2 for all 4 i=l J=l X E n(2) := ~2 and & > 0. These indices represent the same inequality ordering (cf. also . Ebert (1988b) ) and are therefore ordinally equivalent for all & > 0. Ke (·,2) essentially measures the absolute difference between both incomes.
Using Theorem 1 and this family we obtain a characterization of a single parameter family 12 of inequality measures Ke where
Ke(X,n): =-2 LL IX; -Xl for all XEO(n) =lR/l and n~2.
These measures are absolute since the addition of the same amount to each income leaves inequality unchanged. Since Ke ( ·, 2) satisfies NORM automatically, this property required in Theorem 1 has no longer to be postulated explicitly. The family includes Gini's mean differ-· ence 13 for & = 1 . The varian:e is characterized for & = 2, i.e., K 2 ( X, n) = V ( X, n). Given the structure of the measure the parameter & can be chosen to reflect the attitude to inequality.
To the best knowledge of the author the family Ke has not been characterized before. In the literature several (one parameter) generalizations of Gini's mean difference [the Gini coefficient] have been dealt with: Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and Weymark (1981) investigate ethical equality measures (S-Ginis) which are defined on a rank-ordered income vector.
S-Ginis are also discussed by Yitzhaki (1983) . Chakravarty (1988) suggests the family of EGinis by extending one of the many representations of the Gini-coefficient (cf. Yitzhaki 12 Ramasubban (1958 12 Ramasubban ( , 1959 12 Ramasubban ( , 1960 ) considers a subfamily in more detail. He is concerned with measures of variability and not of inequality and confines himself to particular distributions. 13 See Yitzhaki (2003) for a survey of the properties of Gini' s mean difference.
-19 -(1998)). Ebert (l 988a) characterizes two more families of ethical inequality measures which are generalizations of Gini' s mean difference and which are implied by particular aggregation properties of the underlying social welfare function.
It is interesting to investigate the reaction of the me:asures K 5 to a redistribution of income.
We get Thus they satisfy the principle of concentration for every & > 0 whereas the parameter & must not be smaller than unity if PT is to be fulfilled . .
Proof of Proposition 3
We only have to prove: Proof: For 0 < x < y we define two income distributions x' y E n ( n) : x,y, ... ,y) and Y = (x +77,y -77,y, ... ,y) 
Using (2) and leaving a factor of proportionality aside we obtain
The left hand side tends to unity for n ~ oo. 
Since K£ is symmetric and n ~ 2 we can assume that
by assumption. Furthermore we have since f (x) := lx-X 11 + 1 I£ is a convex function for & ;::: 1. 
Extension of Gini's coefficient
Looking at the functional form of the family of measures K£ we recognize that an index K£ (·,n) can be transformed to a relative inequality index fc (·,n) by a simple transformation. We define k£(X,n): =K£(X,n)/µ(xr for ,u(X)>O. Then k(-,n) is invariant with respect to equal proportional changes of all incomes, i.e., it is homogeneous of degree zero. In Proposition 3 we have got a family of compromise measures which are absolute or relative depending on the way they are represented (cf. Blackorby and Donaldson (1980) and Ebert (l 988b) for the concept of compromise measures). In particular, for & = 1 we obtain (a multiple of) the Gini coefficient
In order to characterize the corresponding one parameter family of relative measures directly · and independently of the ch~racterization of the absolute measures, we now confine ourselves to n( n) = IR:+ and suggest an alternative form of the decomposition property for every £ >0:
14 If we renormalize K 1 and divide the index K 1 (-,2) by 1/2, we obtain the usual definition, i.e. In this case the weights employed depend also on the respective arithmetic means. A similar kind of weighting (for c = 1) has been proposed by Foster (1983) in his characterization of .
the Theil measure of inequality. Also the weights used in a decomposition of the generalized entropy class possess this form (cf. equation (32) in Shorrocks (1980) Thus we also obtain a characterization of the one parameter family of inequality measures fc = {ke (-,n)} . In particular for c = 1, i.e., if :DEC(l) is used, the Gini coefficient is n~2 characterized. 15 For & = 2 we get an axiomatization of the normalized variance (or the square of the coefficient of variation). An important result is that the Gini coefficient satisfies the decomposition property :DEC ( c) for & = 1 (or an analogous aggregation property). Thus it is weakly decomposable. In the literature there are numerous attempts to find some kind of decomposability of the Gini coefficient. It is well known that it is decomposable for rankordered income vectors and non-overlapping subgroups (see e.g. Ebert (1988c) ), but it is not decomposable in the conventional sense if arbitrary subgroups can be chosen (see e.g. Zagier (1983) and also Lambert and Decoster (2005) ).
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is obvious: If {i(-,n)L~1 satisfies 5EC (8) for X E n( n) = JR:+ and n 2 2. We get an axiomatization of the variance of logarithms for & = 2, i.e. L 2 (X,n) = VL(X,n) for n 2 2, which has been considered e.g. by Anand (1983) , Sen (1997) , Foster and Ok (1999) , and Foster and Shneyerov (1999 Thus the principle of concentration 1s fulfilled.. These measures properly react to a redistribution of income according to PC. Therefore: they can be used as inequality measures.
It is worth to emphasize that the measures can be axiomatized by means of the decomposition -23 -(aggregation) property DEC (AGG). Though it seems at first sight that this property has been formulated for absolute measures, it can also be used to characterize the relative measures L5 .
Proof of Proposition 5
An index I'; ( X , n) is proportional to I I llnX; -lnxJ , ,= I I j1n(X;/Xi)je.
(a) Claim: PT is violated by Le.
Proof: Define a vector X for any k = n -2 and n 2 3 : Xi := 1 for i = 1, .. . ,k, Xk+I := y and Xk+ 2 := Z for y,z E .Q and 1 < y < Z.
Then we obtain by the definition of X. 
Now we demonstrate that the expression in square brackets on the RHS of (10) is strictly negative for y := ee > 1, z := y + 1, 17: = 1/2: The bracket can be rewritten as
where Thus we have /" ( t) < 0 for t > max { ee-I, 1} .
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Then the RHS of (10) can be made negative by increasing k sufficiently. In this case we get 
Conclusion
The paper has presented a new decomposition and aggregation property for inequality measures and derived their implications for the structure of measures when the principle of population is additionally imposed. The characterization of weakly decomposable and, respectively, weakly aggregable measures does not require any regularity condition (like continuity or differentiability) and is based on a small number of properties. Applying this result we obtain a one parameter family of compromise measures which contains and extends Gini's · mean difference and, respectively, the Gini coefficient. The paper therefore contributes to the debate about the decomposability of the Gini measures. These particular measures are very popular in empirical and theoretical work. Furthennore, a family extending the variance of logarithms is also axiomatized. The reaction of these measures with respect to progressive transfers and concentration is investigated, as well. The results derived are always helpful .
when a decision on the choice of an inequality measure has to be made since they reveal the value judgments underlying these measures.
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the analysis performed in this paper is not only important for the measurement of inequality. The measures discussed can in principle be based on an arbitrary 'distance' measure defined for two individuals and be used for an 
